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being final, the recipient has a vested rights which the legislature
cannot arbitrarily confiscate, recall, or put again in jeopardy.4 While
this statute is remedial, 5 requiring that no judgment be granted for
any residue of the debt remaining unsatisfied where the mortgaged
property shall be sold during the emergency, except after an appraisal
and the reasonable market value of same has been ascertained,6 and
should therefore be liberally construed,7 a construction which would
give it retroactive operation is not favored by the courts.8  Unless
the language dearly and plainly indicated a contrary purpose, a
prospective construction will always be given.9 In the instant case,
the statute became effective in the interim between the rendering of
judgment and sale of the property and therefore has no effect.
A. S. G.
DIVORcE-RIGHT TO DISCONTINUE ACTION.-W instituted an
action for separation in which she obtained judgment and alimony.
The parties then entered into a separation agreement wherein a dif-
ferent financial arrangement was made. While the separation suit
was pending, but before judgment H went to Nevada and obtained
a divorce, W not appearing therein. Thereafter H remarried in a
foreign state. Thereupon, W commenced two actions: (1) against
H and his alleged second wife for a declaratory judgment and (2)
against H for specific performance of the separation agreement.
Personal service was had in each action. As a result of conferences,
W discontinued the two suits and brought an action for divorce
against H, who in consideration thereof agreed to make certain pay-
ments to her. The divorce action was started in good faith, H being
personally served. However, H defaulted on his payments and re-
fused to comply with the terms of the separation agreement, where-
upon W moved for leave to discontinue her divorce action. From
a denial of the motion W appealed. Held, reversed, the special cir-
cumstances present herein permit the granting of W's motion to
'Livingston v. Livingston, 173 N. Y. 377, 66 N. E. 123 (1903).
'Matter of Greene, 166 N. Y. 485, 60 N. E. 183 (1901).
' Instant case.
'N. Y. CIVIL PRACTICE AcT §1083 a.
'Hudler v. Gloden, 36 N. Y. 446 (1867) ; Ayers, et al. v. Lawrence, et al.,
59 N. Y. 196 (1874); Berger, et al. v. Varrelmann, 127 N. Y. 287, 27 N. E.
1065 (1891) ; Allen v. Stevens, 161 N. Y. 143, 55 N. E. 568 (1899).
'Walker v. Walker, 155 N. Y. 77, 49 N. E. 663 (1898); Livingston v.
Livingston, supra note 3; Wilson v. Hinman, 182 N. Y. 411, 75 N. E. 236
(1905).
'Walker v. Walker, supra note 8; Benton v. Wickwore, 54 N. Y. 226(1873); Goillotel v. Mayor, etc., of the City of New York, 87 N. Y. 441(1882); Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N. Y. 235, 111 N. E. 837 (1916).
RECENT DECISIONS
discontinue. Slade v. Slade, 241 App. Div. 465, 272 N. Y. Supp. 700
(1st Dept. 1934).
The Rules of Civil Practice provide that an action or a special
proceeding may be discontinued by the filing with the clerk of the
court in which such action or proceeding may be pending of a stipu-
lation in writing for such discontinuance, signed by the attorneys
of record for all parties, and further that such stipulation shall have
the same effect as an order of discontinuance.' The granting of
such order by the court is an exercise of its discretionary power, it
being empowered to grant or refuse an application for leave to dis-
continue on payment of costs.2 Such application is addressed to the
legal, not the arbitrary, discretion of the court and it can not capri-
ciously deny it.3 The court has a right to refuse permission wherever
circumstances exist which afford a basis for the exercise of legal
discretion and has only to consider whether anything has occurred
since the commencement of the action which would so prejudice H's
interests in the event of discontinuance as to require a denial. 4 In
matrimonial actions, there are two reasons why the rule which guides
the court in determining whether to allow a discontinuance in ordi-
nary actions is not applicable in full: (a) the rights to the parties
to the record are not alone to be considered, for the public is re-
garded as a party and must be treated as such by the court; 5 and
(b) because of the public interest the court has been invested with
a wider discretion in the control of the course of procedure in matri-
monial actions than in others 6 In the exercise of this discretion it
has been held that "a party should no more be compelled to continue
a litigation than to commence one, except where substantial rights
of other parties have accrued and injustice will be done to them by
permitting the discontinuance." 7 Furthermore, the petitioner not
being entitled to a discontinuance as a matter of right the court
possesses the power to impose such terms as it may think just, for
having the right to refuse the request if it so wills,8 if it impose
conditions which the petitioner is unwilling or unable to comply with,
he is in no worse condition than he would have been if the refusal
had been absolute.9 The equities of the parties litigant must be
given consideration and if it can be shown that one of the parties
N. Y. CIVL PRAcTIcE RULE (1929) No. 301.
2 Carleton v. Darcy et al., 75 N. Y. 375 (1878).
'Winans v. Winans, 124 N. Y. 140, 145, 26 N. E. 293 (1891).
"Ibid.; Winston v. Winston, 21 App. Div. 371, 47 N. Y. Supp. 399 (1st
Dept. 1897) ; Borda v. Borda, 43 R. I. 384, 113 Atl. 118 (1921).
Colvin v. Colvin, 2 Paige 385, 386 (N. Y. 1831) ; Blevins v. Blevins, 131
Misc. 315, 316, 226 N. Y. Supp. 553 (1928).
'Winans v. Winans, mtpra note 3; White v. White, 167 Wis. 615, 168
N. W. 704 (1928).
'In re Butler v. Jarvis, Jr., 101 N. Y. 307, 4 N. E. 518 (1886) ; Miller v.
Katz, 143 Misc. 411, 256 N. Y. Supp. 654 (1932).
' Carelton v. Darcy et al., supra note 2.
'In re Application of the Waverly Waterworks, 85 N. Y. 478 (1881).
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will be unjustly discriminated against by permitting the discontinu-
ance it will be denied.' 0
The motion for leave to discontinue being addressed to the dis-
cretion of the court, the decision thereon will not be disturbed unless
there was evident misapprehension of the facts or of the parties or
an abuse of discretion on the part of the court." In the case at
bar the special circumstances and equities involved are such as to




is brought by the wife for separation from her husband on the ground
of abandonment and failure to support. The parties were married
in the state of Illinois and soon after came to this state and resided
here sporadically for about fourteen months. Thereafter husband and
wife removed to California and while there separated. Thereafter
the wife came to New York and brought this action for separation.
Held, wife could maintain an action against husband for separation
and maintenance, where both parties had previously resided in the
state for more than one year and wife was a resident at commence-
ment of action. McDonald v. McDonald, 241 App. Div. 457, 273
N. Y. Supp. 217 (1st Dept. 1934).
Where marriage was consummated without the state I plaintiff
can only maintain an action 2 in the state against a non-resident de-
fendant 3 when the parties have "at some time" been residents 4 of
"0 Van Alen v. Schermerhorn, 14 How. Pr. 287 (N. Y. 1856); Keene v.
Keene, 189 N. Y. Supp. 284 (1921).
' Levey v. Levey, 169 App. Div. 966, 153 N. Y. Supp. 1125 (2d Dept.
1915) ; Crosley v. Fitzpatrick, 23 Weekly Digest 35 (1886).
'Simmons v. Simmons, 208 App. Div. 195, 203 N. Y. Supp. 215 (1st Dept.
1924).
- Barber v. Barber, 137 App. Div. 665, 122 N. Y4 Supp. 452 (1st Dept.
1910).
'Bierstadt v. Bierstadt, 29 App. Div. 210, 51 N. Y. Supp. 862 (4th Dept.
1898) ; May v. May, 233 App. Div. 519, 253 N. Y. Supp. 606 (1st Dept. 1931);
McColl v. McColl, 112 N. Y. Supp. 519 (1908).
'Perrin v. Perrin, 140 Misc. 406, 250 N. Y. Supp. 588 (1931) (a person
is domiciled where he has his true, fixed permanent home and principal estab-
lishment, to which, whenever absent, he intends to return; there must be a
union of residence with intent to establish a domicile but it may exist without
actual residence). See also Kleinrock v. Nantex Mfg., 201 App. Div. 236,
194 N. Y. Supp. 142 (2d Dept. 1922) for interpretation of "residence."
